Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221451
Autoren: 
Myerson, Roger B.
Datum: 
1994
Reihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper 1095
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper develops an economic perspective on political theory, as a guide to some problems and directions of current research. The electoral system and the allocation of powers to elected offices together define the game that politicians play. So democratic structures should be compared and evaluated by analyzing game models, to see how equilibrium behavior of political agents may depend on the structure of the political system. The goal of such research is to predict how the conduct of politicians and the performance of government may depend on the incentives created by the structure of the political system.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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