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Iorio, Kark
Manelli, Alejandro M.
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1073
An example shows that there are well-behaved infinte signaling games with no sequential equilibria. We explore the relationship between equilibrium outcomes of the infinite game and those of approximating games. Consider a sequence of signaling games approaching a limit game. A "(sub)sequence of equilibrium outcomes of the approximating games will converge to a limit distribution. That limit distribution will be an equilibrium outcome of the limit game if it can be realized by strategies of the limit game. As a result of this general convergence result, we prove the existance of sequential and weak-best-response equilibria for strongly monotonic games. In a companion article we explore the role of cheap talk in solving the non-existence problem.
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Working Paper

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