Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221391
Authors: 
Bagwell, Kyle
Ramey, Garey
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1034
Abstract: 
We introduce a model of the retail firm in which consumers and active firms benefit collectively from coordination of sales at fewer firms. Using this model, we show that ostensibly uninformative advertising plays a key role in bringing about coordination economies, by directing consumer search toward firms taht offer the best deals. Optimal consumer scarch takes the form of a simple rule of thumb that uses observed advertising information to guide search. Both industry concentration and social surplus are higher in the presence of advertising, relative to a no-advertising benchmark.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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