Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221387
Authors: 
Matsuyama, Kiminori
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1030
Abstract: 
A pairwise random matching game is considered to identify the social environments that give rise to the social custom and fashion cycles. The game, played by Conformists and Nonconformists, can generate a variety of socially stable behavior patterns. In the path-dependence case, Conformists set the social custom and Nonconformists revolt against it; what actin becomes the custom is determined by "history." In the limit cycle case, Nonconformists become fashion leaders and switch their actions periodically, while Conformists follow with delay. The outcome depends on the relative share of Conformists to Nonconformists as well as their matching patterns.
Subjects: 
Best response dynamics
Bifurcation
Conformity and nonconformity
Equilibrium refinement
Evolutionary process
Limit cycles
Path-dependence
Strategic complements and substitutes
The collective selection and trickle-down theories of fasion
JEL: 
C73
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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