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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1992
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1014
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this paper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first-mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's selection.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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