Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221371
Authors: 
Bagwell, Kyle
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 1014
Abstract: 
Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this paper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first-mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first-mover's selection.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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