Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221363
Autoren: 
Page, Scott E.
Datum: 
1992
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 1006
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper introduces specialized elections. A specialized election randomly assigns each voter to one election, freeing her of voting responsibilities in other elections. By reducing voters' responsibilities, specialized elections encourage more information acquisition. Specialized elections also make campaigning less costly. A shortcoming of specialized elections is the increase in outcome variance resulting from the sampling effect. Whether or not specialized elections improve democratic outcomes hinges upon the tradeoff between more informed voters and greater outcome variance. Sufficient conditions are derived for the increase in information to generate an outcome nearer to that which would be chosen by a fully informed electorate.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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