Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221358
Authors: 
Swinkels, Jeroen M.
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper 1001
Abstract: 
When a strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable (Kohlberg and Mertens [1986]). This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs.
Subjects: 
game theory
evolution
learning
adjustment dynamics
dynamics
dynamic stability
strategic stability
JEL: 
C72
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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