Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221344 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1992
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 986
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
The representation of a cooperative transferable utility game as a linear combination of unanimity games may be viewed as an isomorphism between not-necessarily additive set functions on the players space and additive ones on the coalitions space. We extend the unanimity-basis representation to general (infinite) spaces of players, study spaces of games of games which satisfy certain properties and provide some conditions for sigma-additivity of the resulting additive set function (on the space of coalitions). These results also allow us to extend some representations of the Choquet integral from finite to infinite spaces.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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