Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221336 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1992
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 977
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a common value auction model with bidder participation determined jointly by nature and by bidder optimization. In this framework, an increase in the reserve price as two effects: it deters marginal bidders and it deters bidders from becoming informed. We then derive a test statistic for establishing when it is optimal to raise the reserve price. This statistic is independent of the distribution of valuations. We then apply the analysis to U.S. offshore oil sales and find evidence that the reserve price is dramatically too low.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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