Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221300
Authors: 
Spulber, Daniel F.
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 941R
Abstract: 
Bargaining is examined for the situation in which each party has private information regarding their valuation of the good as well as the value of the good to the other party. The k-double auction and the first-and-final offer bargaining game are shown not to be ex ante incentive efficient. This result contrasts with the independent private values case. A trading process based on priority pricing is shown to implement the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism.
JEL: 
C7
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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