Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/221251 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1990
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Discussion Paper No. 892R
Verlag: 
Northwestern University, Kellogg School of Management, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Evanston, IL
Zusammenfassung: 
Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
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