Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/221251
Authors: 
Matthews, Steven A.
Okuno-Fujiwara, M.
Postlewaite, Andrew
Year of Publication: 
1990
Series/Report no.: 
Discussion Paper No. 892R
Abstract: 
Several conceptual points are made concerning communication in games of asymmetric information. Equilibrium refinements of Sender-Receiver cheap-talk games that are based on he concept of a putative equilibrium, and which rely on the presence of a rich language with literal meanings, are discussed. Three nested criteria are proposed: strong announcement-proofness, announcement-proofness, and weak announcement-proofness.
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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