Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22107
Authors: 
Siklos, Pierre L.
Bohl, Martin T.
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series 2005,8
Abstract: 
In this paper we provide an estimate of the likelihood of conflict between the federal government and the Bundesbank for the 1989 – 1998 period. We rely on a novel proxy for the impact of public communication by Bundesbank officials on the probability of conflict, in addition to interest rate, exchange rate, money supply behavior, as well as electoral influences. The empirical evidence is consistent with the view that speeches by the Bundesbank President dealing with inflation and economic policy are a positive source of conflict in a probabilistic sense. Conflict was not a constant but flared up at times of economic stress and could be exacerbated by the "talking" of Bundesbank officials.
Subjects: 
Deutsche Bundesbank
Conflict
Central Bank Communication
Political Factors
JEL: 
E63
E32
E58
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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