Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/22102 
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dc.contributor.authorStephan, Andreasen
dc.contributor.authorBrück, Tilmanen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:26:08Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:26:08Z-
dc.date.issued2005-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/22102-
dc.description.abstractWe estimate the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Since the adoption of the Stability Pact, Eurozone governments have manipulated forecasts before elections. The political orientation and the institutional design of governments also affects the quality of forecasts.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aEuropean University Viadrina, The Postgraduate Research Programme: Capital Markets and Finance in the Enlarged Europe |cFrankfurt (Oder)en
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aWorking Paper Series |x2005,5en
dc.subject.jelH87en
dc.subject.jelE62en
dc.subject.jelC23en
dc.subject.jelH62en
dc.subject.jelC53en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordfiscal policyen
dc.subject.keywordbudget deficiten
dc.subject.keywordforecast erroren
dc.subject.keywordelectoral cyclesen
dc.subject.stwHaushaltsdefiziten
dc.subject.stwPrognoseen
dc.subject.stwStaatliche Informationen
dc.subject.stwPolitischer Konjunkturzyklusen
dc.subject.stwEU-Stabilitätspakten
dc.subject.stwDeutschlanden
dc.titleDo Eurozone Countries Cheat with their Budget Deficit Forecasts?-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn49790313Xen
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:euvgra:20055en

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