Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22102
Authors: 
Stephan, Andreas
Brück, Tilman
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Working Paper Series 2005,5
Abstract: 
We estimate the political economy determinants of budget deficit forecast errors. Since the adoption of the Stability Pact, Eurozone governments have manipulated forecasts before elections. The political orientation and the institutional design of governments also affects the quality of forecasts.
Subjects: 
fiscal policy
budget deficit
forecast error
electoral cycles
JEL: 
H87
E62
C23
H62
C53
Document Type: 
Working Paper
Social Media Mentions:

Files in This Item:
File
Size
134.62 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.