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Güth, Werner
Stadler, Manfred
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Tübinger Diskussionsbeiträge 282
Traditional game theory usually relies on commonly known decision rationality meaning that choices are made in view of their consequences (the shadow of the future). Evolutionary game theory, however, denies any cognitive deliberation by assuming that choice behavior evolves due to its past success (the shadow of the past) as typical in evolutionary biology. Indirect evolution does not consider the two opposite approaches as mutually exclusive but allows to combine them in various ways (Berninghaus et al., 2003). Here we provide a simple application allowing any linear combination of rational deliberation and path dependence, i.e. of the two "shadows".
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Working Paper

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