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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper No. 2003-03
Verlag: 
Kiel University, Department of Economics, Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper investigates distributive justice using a fourfold experimental design : The ignorance and the risk scenarios are combined with the self-concern and the umpire modes. We study behavioral switches between self-concern and umpire mode and investigate the goodness of ten standards of behavior. In the ignorance scenario, subjects became on average less inequality averse as umpires. A within-subjects analysis shows that about one half became less inequality averse, one quarter became more inequality averse and one quarter left its behavior unchanged as umpires. In the risk scenario, subjects become on average more inequality averse in their umpire roles. A within-subjects analysis shows that half of them became more inequality averse, one quarter became less inequality averse, and one quarter left its behavior unchanged as umpires. As to the standards of behavior, several prominent ones (leximin, leximax, Gini, Cobb-Douglas) experienced but poor support, while expected utility, Boulding's hypothesis, the entropy social welfare function, and randomization preference enjoyed impressive acceptance. For the risk scenario, the tax standard of behavior joins the favorite standards of behavior.
Schlagwörter: 
Distributive justice
income distributions
veil of ignorance
JEL: 
C91
D63
D31
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
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