Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/220066
Authors: 
Ioannidis, Konstantinos
Offerman, Theo
Sloof, Randolph
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI 2020-029/I
Abstract: 
The Verifiability Approach is a lie detection method based on the insight that truth-tellers provide precise details whereas liars sometimes remain vague to avoid being exposed. We provide a-game-theoretic analysis of a speaker who wants to be acquitted and an investigator who prefers to find out the truth. The investigator can verify the speaker’s statement at some cost; verification gets more reliable the more details are provided. If, after a falsified statement, the investigator convicts, an additional obstruction penalty is imposed. We derive all the equilibria of the game and thereby the conditions under which the investigator can infer additional information from the speaker's statement at face value. Strategic information revelation by the speaker and verification by the investigator then necessarily work in tandem. Improvements in reliability result in more valuable (strategic) information transmission, whereas a harsher obstruction penalty does not as soon as a lower limit is met.
Subjects: 
Lie detection
Verifiability approach
Strategic information revelation
JEL: 
K14
C72
D01
D82
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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