Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985 
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dc.contributor.authorRaff, Horsten
dc.contributor.authorSchmitt, Nicolasen
dc.date.accessioned2009-01-29T14:13:11Z-
dc.date.available2009-01-29T14:13:11Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/10419/21985-
dc.description.abstractThis paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade liberalization may lead firms to choose common agency. Social welfare can be raised by prohibiting exclusive dealing (common agency) when trade barriers are high (low) and products are close substitutes.en
dc.language.isoengen
dc.publisher|aKiel University, Department of Economics |cKielen
dc.relation.ispartofseries|aEconomics Working Paper |x2004-09en
dc.subject.jelL42en
dc.subject.jelF12en
dc.subject.jelF13en
dc.subject.ddc330en
dc.subject.keywordexclusive dealingen
dc.subject.keywordcommon agencyen
dc.subject.keywordinternational tradeen
dc.subject.keywordcompetition policyen
dc.subject.stwVertriebsbindungen
dc.subject.stwHandelsvertretungen
dc.subject.stwOligopolen
dc.subject.stwInternationaler Wettbewerben
dc.subject.stwProtektionismusen
dc.subject.stwAussenhandelsliberalisierungen
dc.subject.stwTheorieen
dc.titleExclusive Dealing and Common Agency in International Markets-
dc.typeWorking Paperen
dc.identifier.ppn475075196en
dc.rightshttp://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungenen
dc.identifier.repecRePEc:zbw:cauewp:2440en

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