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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Economics Working Paper No. 2003-10
Verlag: 
Kiel University, Department of Economics, Kiel
Zusammenfassung: 
Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.
Schlagwörter: 
trade policy
political economy
representative democracy
JEL: 
D72
F10
F13
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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