Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/21975
Authors: 
Willmann, Gerald
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Economics working paper / Christian-Albrechts-Universität Kiel, Department of Economics 2003-10
Abstract: 
Based on the observation that industries are often geographically concentrated, this paper proposes a new political economy model of trade protection. We associate the sectors of a specific factors model with electoral districts populated by continua of heterogeneous voters who differ in their relative factor endowments. We show how strategic delegation leads each district to elect a representative who is more protectionist than the median voter. The legislature formed by these representatives then sets tariffs that are strictly positive. Introducing additional policy instruments reveals a trade-off between efficiency and regional targetability.
Subjects: 
trade policy
political economy
representative democracy
JEL: 
D72
F10
F13
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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