Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219250 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 10 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1-18
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
In most situations of voluntary contribution people are willing to give at the beginning, however contribution rates decay over time. In a new setup we introduce non-enforceable sharing rules, as requests, in a repeated redistribution game (called tip pooling). Three experimental treatments differ by the requested amount of sharing of privately known random endowments (tips), with one player never receiving any endowment. Using a hurdle model, we find no significant difference in free riding between the three sharing rules, but strong differences in positive contributions which, however, are lower than the rules prescribe. Furthermore, the average positive contribution remains stable over time, while free riding tends to increase.
Schlagwörter: 
redistribution
ethics
deontological values
social norms
non-enforceable rule
equity
tip pooling
hurdle model
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