Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/219241
Authors: 
Batzilis, Dimitris
Jaffe, Sonia
Levitt, Steven D.
List, John A.
Picel, Jeffrey
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 10 [Year:] 2019 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 1-34
Abstract: 
We make use of data from a Facebook application where hundreds of thousands of people played a simultaneous move, zero-sum game-rock-paper-scissors-with varying information to analyze whether play in strategic settings is consistent with extant theories. We report three main insights. First, we observe that most people employ strategies consistent with Nash, at least some of the time. Second, however, players strategically use information on previous play of their opponents, a non-Nash equilibrium behavior; they are more likely to do so when the expected payoffs for such actions increase. Third, experience matters: players with more experience use information on their opponents more effectively than less experienced players, and are more likely to win as a result. We also explore the degree to which the deviations from Nash predictions are consistent with various non-equilibrium models. We analyze both a level-k framework and an adapted quantal response model. The naive version of each these strategies-where players maximize the probability of winning without considering the probability of losing-does better than the standard formulation. While one set of people use strategies that resemble quantal response, there is another group of people who employ strategies that are close to k1; for naive strategies the latter group is much larger.
Subjects: 
play in strategic settings
large-scale data set
Nash equilibrium
non-equilibrium strategies
JEL: 
C72
D03
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article
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