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Inaba, Misato
Takahashi, Nobuyuki
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[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 10 [Year:] 2019 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 1-15
Since social dilemmas among n-persons are often embedded in other types of social exchanges, the exclusion of defectors in social dilemmas from other exchanges functions as a costless selective incentive. Recently, such 'linkage' has been considered as a promising solution to resolve the social dilemma problem. However, previous research showed that cooperation sustained by linkage is fragile when subjective perception errors exist. The purpose of this study is to find linkage strategies that are robust against subjective perception errors. Based on the strategies presented in previous studies on indirect reciprocity, we devised several linkage strategies and examined their evolutionary stability by agent-based simulation. The simulation results showed that the linkage strategy based on kandori was evolutionarily stable even when perception errors existed. Our study provides substantial support for the argument that linkage is a plausible solution to the social dilemma problem.
linked game
social dilemma
public goods game
indirect reciprocity
agent-based simulation
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