Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219210 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 4 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-25
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
Theoretical models on network formation focus mostly on the stability and efficiency of equilibria, but they cannot deliver an understanding of why specific equilibrium networks are selected or whether they are all actually reachable from any starting network. To study factors affecting equilibrium selection, we designed a network formation experiment with multiple equilibria, which can be categorized in terms of the demand on players' farsightedness and robustness to errors. In a second scenario, we increase the need for farsighted behavior by players, as well as the perceived riskiness of equilibria by adding a stage in which the network is disrupted. This setting allows us to analyze the interplay between the need for farsightedness and perceived risk of errors and its effect on network formation and equilibrium selection.
Subjects: 
network disruption
experiment
network formation
non-cooperative network games
JEL: 
C72
D85
C92
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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