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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-13
Verlag: 
MDPI, Basel
Zusammenfassung: 
We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals' punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.
Schlagwörter: 
peer punishment
strategy method
type classification
public goods game
coordination game
weakest link game
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