Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Albrecht, Felix
Kube, Sebastian
Year of Publication: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Year:] 2018 [Issue:] 3 [Pages:] 1-13
We elicit individual-level peer-punishment types in a cooperation (social dilemma) and a coordination (weakest link) problem. In line with previous literature, we find heterogeneity in peer-punishment in both environments. Comparing punishment behavior across the two environments within subject, we observe a high degree of individuals' punishment type stability. However, the aggregate punishment demand is higher in the weakest-link game. The difference between the two environments is driven by subjects whose behavioral types are inconsistent rather than by a change in the punishment demand of those who punish in both environments.
peer punishment
strategy method
type classification
public goods game
coordination game
weakest link game
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Appears in Collections:

Files in This Item:

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.