Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219176 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Games [ISSN:] 2073-4336 [Volume:] 9 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] MDPI [Place:] Basel [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 1-19
Publisher: 
MDPI, Basel
Abstract: 
A simple expression is derived for the optimal strategy in the minimum effort game. This maps from player beliefs to an optimal effort level. From this expression the set of Nash equilibria in the game is fully characterized. All Nash equilibria are symmetric and involve at most two actions being played with positive probability. We discuss how our expression for the optimal strategy can help inform on the comparative statics of a change in the number of players and effort cost benefit ratio.
Subjects: 
weak link game
minimum effort game
Nash equilibrium
beliefs
JEL: 
C72
D01
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article
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