Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/219139 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8321
Publisher: 
Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Abstract: 
This paper studies the design of the policy mix in a monetary union, that is, the institutional arrangement specifying the relationships between the various policymakers present in the union and the extent of their capacity of action. It is assumed that policymakers do not cooperate. Detailing several institutional variants imposed on an otherwise standard macromodel of a monetary union, we prove that there is no Pareto-superior design when cooperation between policymakers is impossible.
Subjects: 
monetary union
fiscal policy
monetary policy
cooperation
policy mix
JEL: 
E58
E62
F45
H76
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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