Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/218866 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
DIW Discussion Papers No. 1825
Version Description: 
This Version: May 2020
Publisher: 
Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Berlin
Abstract: 
We develop a structural model to address the question whether, and to what extent, expert panelists engage in herd behavior when voting on important policy questions. Our data comes from FDA advisory committees voting on questions concerning the approval of new drug applications. We utilize a change in the voting procedure from sequential to simultaneous voting to identify herding. Estimates suggest that around half of the panelists are willing to vote against their private assessment if votes from previous experts indicate otherwise and, on average, 9 percent of the sequential votes are actual herd-votes. Temporary committee members are more prone to herding than regular (standing) members. We find that simultaneous voting improves information aggregation given our estimates.
Subjects: 
herd behavior
expert committees
structural estimation
FDA
public health
JEL: 
D72
D82
D83
D91
I10
I18
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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