Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217711
Year of Publication: 
2012
Citation: 
[Journal:] European Journal of Government and Economics (EJGE) [ISSN:] 2254-7088 [Volume:] 1 [Issue:] 2 [Publisher:] Universidade da Coruña [Place:] A Coruña [Year:] 2012 [Pages:] 106-125
Publisher: 
Universidade da Coruña, A Coruña
Abstract: 
Elected representatives serving their final period face only weak incentives to provide costly effort. However, overlapping generations (OLG) models suggest that exit prizes sustained by trigger strategies can induce representatives in their final period to provide such effort. We evaluate this hypothesis using a simple OLG public good experiment, the central treatment being whether exit prizes are permitted. We find that a significantly higher number of subjects in their final period contribute when exit prizes are permitted. However, this result does not originate from use of trigger strategies. More likely explanations include gift-exchange and focal-point effects.
Subjects: 
overlapping generations
last period effects
legislatures
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by Logo
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.