Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217657 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice [ISSN:] 2336-9205 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] De Gruyter Open [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 91-110
Publisher: 
De Gruyter Open, Warsaw
Abstract: 
The main motives behind the adoption of an inflation targeting regime largely relate to the notion of credibility, transparency of monetary policy and the autonomy of the central bank, which explicitly undertakes to achieve a certain inflation target. This paper examines the effects of inflation targeting in emerging economies in relation to the degree of independence of the central bank and the credibility of monetary policy. We find effects in emerging economies with little central bank independence, so our findings suggest that the central bank’s credibility, transparency and independence is a prerequisite for emerging economies to experience a decline in inflation following the adoption of inflation targeting.
Subjects: 
Credibility
transparency
central bank independence
inflation targeting
JEL: 
E52
E63
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc-nd Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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