Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217653 
Year of Publication: 
2018
Citation: 
[Journal:] Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice [ISSN:] 2336-9205 [Volume:] 7 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] De Gruyter Open [Place:] Warsaw [Year:] 2018 [Pages:] 25-40
Publisher: 
De Gruyter Open, Warsaw
Abstract: 
In recent decades, there has been a trend in increasing the level of independence of central banks. The key factor that has contributed to a growing interest in this concept is grounded in economic theory that confirms the link between a lower inflation rate and a greater level of central bank independence. For this reason, in many countries, the existing regulations relating to central bank have been modified to protect its position from the absolute influence of the executive power of the state. This trend was particularly prevalent in transition countries, which was conditioned primarily by the EU accession criteria. The aim of this paper is to analyse independence of the Central Bank of Montenegro through the prism of functional, institutional, financial, and personal independence, and to assess the level of its legal independence by using appropriate indices.
Subjects: 
central bank independence
indices
Montenegro.
JEL: 
E52
E58
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Article

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