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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 15 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2020 [Pages:] 361-413
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
I study multi-unit auction design when bidders have private values, multi-unit demands, and non-quasilinear preferences. Without quasilinearity, the Vickrey auction loses its desired incentive and efficiency properties. I give conditions under which we can design a mechanism that retains the Vickrey auction's desirable incentive and efficiency properties: (1) individual rationality, (2) dominant strategy incentive compatibility, and (3) Pareto efficiency. I show that there is a mechanism that retains the desired properties of the Vickrey auction if there are two bidders who have single-dimensional types. I also present an impossibility theorem that shows that there is no mechanism that satisfies Vickrey's desired properties and weak budget balance when bidders have multi-dimensional types.
Schlagwörter: 
Multi-unit auctions
multi-dimensional mechanism design
wealth effects
JEL: 
D44
D47
D61
D82
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