Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217099
Authors: 
Richter, Michael
Rubinstein, Ariel
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Year:] 2019 [Issue:] 4 [Pages:] 1169-1183
Abstract: 
We suggest a concept of convexity of preferences that does not rely on any algebraic structure. A decision maker has in mind a set of orderings interpreted as evaluation criteria. A preference relation is defined to be convex when it satisfies the following: if for each criterion there is an element that is both inferior to b by the criterion and superior to a by the preference relation, then b is preferred to a. This definition generalizes the standard Euclidean definition of convex preferences. It is shown that under general conditions, any strict convex preference relation is represented by a maxmin of utility representations of the criteria. Some economic examples are provided.
Subjects: 
Convex preferences
abstract convexity
maxmin utility
JEL: 
D01
C60
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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