Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217092 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 849-886
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies an N-person war of attrition which needs one exit for its ending. An N-person war of attrition is qualitatively different from its two-person version. Only in the former, the set of players who are actively engaged in a war of attrition may change over time. We introduce the possibility of a non-compromising type and characterize the unique equilibrium by identifying which players are actively involved in a war of attrition at each moment. We examine who is likely to exit and when the war of attrition ends quickly. As the leading example, we study how a group selects a volunteer in a dynamic setting.
Schlagwörter: 
War of attrition
unique equilibrium
JEL: 
D71
C78
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