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Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1115-1167
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper studies infinite-horizon stochastic games in which players observe payoffs and noisy public information about a hidden state each period. We find that, very generally, the feasible and individually rational payoff set is invariant to the initial prior about the state in the limit as the discount factor goes to one. This result ensures that players can punish or reward the opponents via continuation payoffs in a flexible way. Then we prove the folk theorem, assuming that public randomization is available. The proof is constructive, and uses the idea of random blocks to design an effective punishment mechanism.
Schlagwörter: 
Stochastic game
hidden state
uniform connectedness
robust connectedness
random blocks
folk theorem
JEL: 
C72
C73
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
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