Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217081 
Authors: 
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 71-102
Publisher: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Abstract: 
This paper extends Milgrom and Robert's treatment of supermodular games in two ways. It points out that their main characterization result holds under a weaker assumption. It refines the arguments to provide bounds on the set of strategies that survive iterated deletion of weakly dominated strategies. I derive the bounds by iterating the best-response correspondence. I give conditions under which they are independent of the order of deletion of dominated strategies. The results have implications for equilibrium selection and dynamic stability in games.
Subjects: 
Supermodularity
dominance
equilibrium selection
JEL: 
C72
D81
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Article

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