Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217072 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2018
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 3 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 1063-1114
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
For a partnership model with general type distributions and interdependent values, we derive the optimal dissolution mechanisms that, for arbitrary initial ownership, maximize any convex combination of revenue and social surplus. The solution involves ironing around typically interior worst-off types, which are endogenously determined. The optimal ownership structures are such that, with identical distributions, equal shares are always optimal. With non-identical distributions, the optimal shares are typically asymmetric; the identity of the agents with large shares may change with the importance of revenue generation; and even fully concentrated initial ownership, and assigning zero shares to the strongest agents, can be optimal.
Schlagwörter: 
Partnership dissolution
mechanism design
property rights
interdependent values
asymmetric type distributions
JEL: 
D23
D61
D82
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Article

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
729.89 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.