Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217067
Authors: 
Eguia, Jon X.
Nicolò, Antonio
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Year:] 2019 [Issue:] 2 [Pages:] 373-402
Abstract: 
We present an electoral theory on the public provision of local public goods to an imperfectly informed electorate. We show that electoral incentives lead to greater spending if the electorate is not well informed. A more informed electorate induces candidates to target funds only to specific constituencies, which can reduce aggregate welfare
Subjects: 
Local public goods
information
elections
targeted spending
JEL: 
H41
D72
D82
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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