Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/217059 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Quellenangabe: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 1 [Publisher:] The Econometric Society [Place:] New Haven, CT [Year:] 2019 [Pages:] 39-69
Verlag: 
The Econometric Society, New Haven, CT
Zusammenfassung: 
We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.
Schlagwörter: 
Dynamic mechanism design
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
revenue maximization
full surplus extraction
JEL: 
C73
D47
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
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