Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/217059
Authors: 
Noda, Shunya
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Theoretical Economics [ISSN:] 1555-7561 [Volume:] 14 [Year:] 2019 [Issue:] 1 [Pages:] 39-69
Abstract: 
We study full surplus extraction and implementation in dynamic environments. We exploit intertemporal correlations of agents' types to construct within-period ex post incentive compatible mechanisms. First, we formulate one-shot environments, in which a single agent has a hidden type and the planner observes a public signal about the agent's type after a type-contingent allocation is chosen. We propose necessary and sufficient conditions for full surplus extraction (strong detectability) and for implementability of the targeted allocation rule (weak detectability) in this one-shot problem. We decompose the general dynamic problem into one-shot problems, and obtain sufficient conditions for surplus extraction and implementation.
Subjects: 
Dynamic mechanism design
perfect Bayesian equilibrium
revenue maximization
full surplus extraction
JEL: 
C73
D47
D82
D86
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

Files in This Item:
File
Size
347.39 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.