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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8246
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We characterise the entire set of symmetric stationary Markov-perfect Nash equilibria (MPE) in a differential game of public good investment, using the canonical problem of climate change as an example. We provide a sufficient and necessary condition for MPE and show how the entire set of MPE is constructed. The equilibrium in continuous strategies, unique in our context, is Pareto-dominated by any other equilibrium. If a Pareto-undominated steady state exists, it is sustained by trigger-like strategies, with deviations above and below the steady state leading to different responses. We extend the theory of differential games to deal with payoffs under discontinuous strategies. Our methods work under general functional forms.
Schlagwörter: 
differential games
Markov-perfect Nash equilibrium
dynamic investment games
dynamic public goods
climate change
JEL: 
C61
C73
D90
Q54
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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