Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216891
Authors: 
Akin, Ozlem
Coleman, Nicholas
Fons-Rosen, Christian
Peydró, José-Luis
Year of Publication: 
2019
Citation: 
[Journal:] Financial Management [ISSN:] 1755-053X [Volume:] Forthcoming [Issue:] Accepted manuscript online
Abstract: 
We study insider trading behavior surrounding the largest bank bailout in history: TARP. In politically‐connected banks, insider buying during the pre‐TARP period is associated with increases in abnormal returns around bank‐specific TARP announcement; for unconnected banks, trading and returns are uncorrelated. Results hold across insiders within the same bank and are stronger for finance‐related government connections. Through a FOIA request we obtained the previously undisclosed TARP funds requested; the ratio of received to requested funds correlates both with abnormal returns and insider buying behavior in connected banks.
Subjects: 
political connections
political economy in banking
insider trading
TARP
bank bailouts
JEL: 
D72
G01
G21
G28
Published Version’s DOI: 
Document Type: 
Article
Document Version: 
Manuscript Version (Preprint)

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