Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/216834
Authors: 
Qin, Botao
Year of Publication: 
2020
Citation: 
[Journal:] Economics: The Open-Access, Open-Assessment E-Journal [ISSN:] 1864-6042 [Year:] 2020 [Volume:] 14 [Issue:] 2020-11 [Pages:] 1-15
Abstract: 
This paper explores whether a truth-telling promise can work to reduce the hypothetical bias in preference elicitation. Using an induced value experiment in China with a random nth-price auction, the author finds: 1) Hypothetical bias exists in a random nth-price auction with induced values and making a truth-telling promise can reduce the hypothetical bias. 2) All treatments are demand-revealing except for the hypothetical baseline.
Subjects: 
Hypothetical bias
oath
random nth-price auction
induced value experiment
JEL: 
C90
D44
O51
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Document Type: 
Article

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