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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
CESifo Working Paper No. 8176
Verlag: 
Center for Economic Studies and ifo Institute (CESifo), Munich
Zusammenfassung: 
We analyze the political stability of capital funded social security. In particular, using a stylized theoretical framework we study the mechanisms behind governments capturing pension assets in order to lower current taxes. This is followed by an analysis of the analogous mechanisms in a fully-edged overlapping generations model with intra-cohort heterogeneity. Funding is efficient in a Kaldor-Hicks sense. Individuals vote on capturing the accumulated pension assets and replacing the funded pension pillar with a pay-as-you-go scheme. We show that even if capturing assets reduces welfare in the long run, it always has sufficient political support from those alive at the moment of the vote.
Schlagwörter: 
funded pensions
asset capture
majority voting
welfare
JEL: 
H55
D72
E17
E27
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper
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