Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/216444 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2020
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13132
Verlag: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Zusammenfassung: 
This paper evaluates the labor market effects of sick pay mandates in the United States. Using the National Compensation Survey and difference-in-differences models, we estimate their impact on coverage rates, sick leave use, labor costs, and non-mandated fringe benefits. Sick pay mandates increase coverage significantly by 13 percentage points from a baseline level of 66%. Newly covered employees take two additional sick days per year. We find little evidence that mandating sick pay crowds-out other non-mandated fringe benefits. We then develop a model of optimal sick pay provision along with a welfare analysis. For a range of plausible parameter values, mandating sick pay increases welfare.
Schlagwörter: 
sick pay mandates
sick leave
medical leave
employer mandates
fringe benefits
moral hazard
unintended consequences
labor costs
National Compensation Survey (NCS)
welfare effects
optimal social insurance
Baily-Chetty
JEL: 
I12
I13
I18
J22
J28
J32
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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