Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/216433 
Year of Publication: 
2020
Series/Report no.: 
IZA Discussion Papers No. 13121
Publisher: 
Institute of Labor Economics (IZA), Bonn
Abstract: 
Improving schools depends on attracting high-caliber teachers and increasing retention, both made possible by appealing to teacher preferences. I deploy a discrete-choice experiment in a setting where teachers have reason to reveal their preferences. There are three main findings: (1) I calculate willingness-to-pay for a series of workplace attributes including salary structure, retirement benefits, performance pay, class size, and time-to-tenure. (2) Highly rated teachers have stronger preferences for schools offering performance pay, which may be used to differentially attract and retain them. (3) Under various criteria, schools seem to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement benefits.
Subjects: 
teachers
labor market
achievement
retention
selection
JEL: 
I20
J32
J45
M50
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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