Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/215747 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2019
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
DICE Discussion Paper No. 314
Versionsangabe: 
October 2019
Verlag: 
Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE), Düsseldorf
Zusammenfassung: 
Rules of consumer protection or fair competition can be publicly or privately enforced. We consider the possibility of false advertising by a firm in duopolistic competition where consumers can be distinguished according to whether or not they form rational beliefs about the trustworthiness of advertising claims. We compare private and public law enforcement in the form of the demand for injunctions against false advertising. From a welfare perspective, we show that it can be optimal either to have the private entity (the competitor/a consumer protection agency) or the government agency as plaintiff, where the optimal regime depends on the share of näive consumers and the level of trial costs in a non-trivial way.
Schlagwörter: 
injunction suits
false advertising
law enforcement
naïve consumer
product differentiation
JEL: 
K41
K42
L13
L15
ISBN: 
978-3-86304-599-9
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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